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1. What Justice Is and Isn’t 
 
Talk about justice, as we all know, can be talk about either of two 
very different things, as Aristotle pointed out so long ago. On the 
one hand, justice can be understood as embracing everything that is 
good. A just society, on this view, is simply a good society. So 
understood, justice is comprehensive, and thus not liable to be 
contrasted to any other value. On the other hand, and distinctively, 
justice is a special value, most commonly rendered as fairness. It is 
the value of ensuring that each person is accorded their due, whether 
in terms of needs or merits, distribution or retribution, assignment or 
correction. On this view justice is essentially allocative. That is not 
to identify the two. The focus of allocation is not necessarily on 
justice (one may allocate the hours in the day to different tasks, or to 
work and to leisure) but the focus of justice is on allocation. There is 
more to it than that, of course, and for that reason I will return to 
                                            
1 Thanks to Timothy Endicott for inviting me to contribute to the conference for 
which I composed the first, rather more compact draft of this paper, and to John 
Gardner, for reading the final, lengthy version of it, and for offering, as ever, acute 
and yet unfailingly supportive comment. It was the privilege of a lifetime to work 
with him; it has now become an unspeakable sorrow that he is no more. I have 
slimmed down the lengthy version for this publication, with the result that a few 
references in the text are to passages omitted here for the sake of economy. The 
full version is forthcoming as part of a book on 20th century goodness, and more 
broadly, on the relationship between reason and circumstance.  
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the question of allocation later. Yet that is enough for present 
purposes. What matters here is that the allocative nature of justice, 
which is one of its inescapable features, gives rise to two significant 
difficulties. 
 
The first is that many good things in life are not susceptible to 
allocation, so as to make justice a very incomplete guide to a good 
life. That, of course, is no more than simply what follows from any 
understanding of justice as a special rather than a comprehensive 
value, but it does highlight the need to keep justice in its place so to 
speak, not to allow it to become too large a concern in our lives, lest 
it crowd out other concerns that are essential to our flourishing, as 
well as highlighting the consequent issue of exactly which particular 
places in our lives to assign justice to. 
 
The second and more profound difficulty, however, is that the 
pursuit of justice is inimical to the realization of certain other values, 
which are not merely marginalized, so as to be eclipsed by justice, 
but actually precluded by the terms on which justice depends. Put 
colloquially, if not keeping score is constitutive of certain valuable 
ways of being, then those ways of being cannot coexist with justice. 
To be kind, for example, to be generous, to be compassionate, to be 
loving, is not to keep score. To be any of these things is to reject the 
claims of justice, at least pro tanto, not merely to neglect them. Such 
forms of goodness are constituted, in part, by their disregard for what 
is due. That is both a good and a bad thing, and it is vital not to 
neglect either of those facts in attending to the other. 
 
A year or so ago my mother, then in her late eighties, fell while on a 
visit to London, and broke her femur. She had a steel rod inserted in 
her leg and spent some time recuperating in St Thomas’s Hospital, 
overlooking the Thames. She said to me one day, speaking of her 
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care by the nursing staff, ‘These are people who have dedicated their 
lives to kindness’. Something in the shape of the observation struck 
me. To dedicate one’s life to kindness is to move beyond justice, 
although not, as we all know, beyond the claims of justice. So nurses 
today, in a world very largely made answerable to justice, are not so 
much expected to be kind as to check patients at certain intervals, to 
monitor a specified list of concerns, and more generally, to behave in 
ways that can be held to account: has the patient received what was 
owed to her, and can that be demonstrated? If the nurses tending my 
mother had behaved like that my mother could not have made the 
observation that she did. 
 
Something is lost in this, and that something is essential to kindness, 
which is a virtue that is not only unforced but also unforceable, not 
susceptible to measure and assignment. Something is also gained of 
course, in terms of everything that accountability makes possible on 
the one hand and impossible on the other, in the needs that can be 
met and the neglect that can be exposed. The opacity that allows 
kindness to flourish also screens abuse. To shine the light of justice 
into every corner is to drive the shadows out of social practice, with 
all the valuable nuances that they give rise to, and all the malfeasance 
that they conceal. 
 
 
2. Fairness and the Lives of Children 
 
I remember once wearily reflecting, upon hearing yet again, perhaps 
from my brother at some time when we were both young adults, the 
eternal complaint that ‘It’s not fair!’, that fairness is for children. It is 
something that we leave behind when we become adult, something 
that we grow out of, as part of the moral development that Aristotle 
expected of us. This gives rise to a tempting line of thought which, 
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it seems to me, offers some insight, although it will prove to be 
ultimately unsatisfying, because it is insufficiently probing. 
 
Many people of my generation made a very conscious decision not 
to grow up so as to become something like our parents, and in 
particular not to lose the sense of unfairness, of injustice, that our 
parents seemed to have lost, and so not to lose the need to protest 
that injustice, to fight against it, to be constitutively opposed to it. 
People did not want to become, as they saw it, compromised and 
inured, to accept the idea that life is not fair, (in the sense of being 
unfair, rather than in the sense of being about something other than 
fairness). As members of a new generation, committed to the fact of 
its youth and the insight they took that to embody, people sought to 
grow powerful without growing up, to discover ways to make their 
voice count in its own special register. Don’t trust anyone over 30, it 
was said, until of course we all turned 30 ourselves, and fell silent on 
the point. Such people insisted on the binary, that what is not just is 
unjust. If you’re not part of the solution you’re part of the problem.  
 
Put less colloquially, the line of argument ran something like this. If 
one will but face up to the fact, one is bound to recognize that there 
is injustice everywhere, embedded in social practices that we have 
not had the honesty, the courage, or the integrity to question and to 
challenge, injustice not simply in the broad sense, that the world is 
not nearly as good a place as it ought to be, but in the specific sense 
of the misallocation of prosperity, opportunity, security, stability, 
health, sustenance, housing, and many other vital goods. We cannot 
fail to act in the face of such injustice, it was insisted. This world of 
manifold injustice is hidden behind self-serving veils that present as 
virtues what in fact are only devices fostered and promoted by the 
authors and beneficiaries of injustice. Do not be deluded by appeals 
to kindness, generosity, charity, or even love. Those are but schemes 
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that a corrupt culture has employed to persuade people to embrace 
their subordination as a good. The essence of the most basic line of 
thought here was elegantly and incisively captured by Nietzsche, and 
re-presented with a different target in mind by radical feminists such 
as Catharine MacKinnon. It became the foundation of a political 
retort that the determinedly young and uncorrupted made to their 
contemporary counterparts, the hippies and the flower children, 
many of whose practices, one is bound to observe, were appallingly 
unjust, as those of us who were straight enough at the time to 
remember the era properly now recall with a wince. Love is most 
emphatically not all that you need. In a great many of its forms it is 
something to be seen through and exposed. 
 
To see the world in this way is to achieve what appears to be great 
moral clarity, to reduce the challenges before us to ones primarily of 
courage and of will. It is also to present the claims of morality as 
straightforward, non-contradictory, and inescapable. Injustice must 
be confronted, not avoided, excused, or presented as conflicted, to 
the warranting of moral inertia. Yet it seems to me that while there 
is truth in this picture of the impulse to justice it is not quite right. 
There is more to that impulse than can be explained by the presence 
of the child in us all. The outlines of a fuller answer are visible in the 
circumstances of childhood, but transcend them. 
 
Children are moral primitives. When asked to think unegoistically 
they are driven to think reciprocally, in terms of the claims of other 
egos, rather than in terms that reflect grasp of the fact that the moral 
life goes beyond ego. In doing so they become political, not because 
politics is childish (though in many settings it is and is expected to be 
fundamentally egotistic), but because politics (whether democratic or 
otherwise) arrives at similar conclusions as a consequence of different 
disabilities. It too lacks the capacity for empathy and the values and 
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virtues that depend on empathy, and that is the source of its strength 
and its limitations. The two impulses, the childish and the political, 
come together when certain people, alive to the goods that this 
perspective makes possible, seek to hold at bay the complications  (as 
well as the returns) that a richer perspective would press upon them, 
the richer perspective towards which many members of previous 
generations had strained, and so prize justice above other virtues. In 
doing so they make a cardinal virtue of what is necessary to politics 
but is ultimately no less the instrument of a set of correlative moral 
disabilities, disabilities that are far from inconsequential in many 
settings, and thus all too often ground for more than the necessary 
regret that accompanies hard choices between incommensurables, of 
the kind that has come to be conventionally if brutally expressed in 
terms of omelettes and eggs. 
 
To put it in other terms, there is a bidirectional scheme of influence 
here. Certain moral roles entail recourse to fairness, and to the 
institutions and social practices that the vindication of fairness entails, 
while those institutions, and the authority and the distance that they 
embody and depend on, entail the adoption of certain moral roles, 
the roles of justice. In this way the dynamic of justice self-fulfillingly 
describes a moral role and a moral outlook, both self-referential, to 
the cost of its alternatives. 
 
 
3. The Personal and the Political 
 
Another no less familiar and no less tired slogan from the Sixties is 
that the personal is political. What makes this a slogan is that it 
presents an ambition as a description. The personal can certainly be 
made political, but at the cost of much of its personality. Some of 
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that personality is better gone, some is worth sacrificing, but some is 
all things considered to be mourned. 
 
As the popularity of this and other slogans attests, people are 
attracted to an uncomplicated picture of moral life. In this they are 
sometimes merely simplistic, whether out of intellectual laziness, or 
something more malign, or the familiar, unpleasant combination of 
both those things: think of the world as presented by Nigel Farage. 
As often, however, they are wise, for we would live less well if we 
had to be thinking about everything all the time, if we had no 
recourse to moral mechanisms beyond our own reflection, not only 
because we would be overwhelmed by the task of doing so, but 
more important perhaps, because we would lose touch with the 
value of what is spontaneous and innate, so as to constitute personal 
and communal virtue, as well as the value of what is formally 
determined, and so as best as we can make it, unequivocal, 
prospective, and relatively stable and reliable.  
 
This gives rise to a picture of moral life that Aristotle would surely 
recognize. On the one hand we internalize the claims of goodness, 
so as to make them part of our character, and our response to them 
unforced. We do this both individually and as participants in certain 
shared social practices, from family to community to country to yet 
broader forms of shared heritage, practices the sharing of which is 
such as to be constitutive of virtue as we practise it in our lives, 
practices that constitute what we commonly call cultures. We draw 
upon these various cultures for much of the goodness that we seek 
to embody in our lives, as those lives are shaped by the virtue of our 
persons. On the other hand, once again both as individuals and as 
participants in shared social practices, we do the opposite, and so 
externalize and institutionalize the claims of goodness, thereby giving 
them public and authoritative form, making them the formal burden 
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of some other. Doing this carries with it a significant degree of 
reductiveness, for better and for worse, both in our understanding of 
what is at stake and in our modes of response to it. This follows in 
part from the fact that the pre-emptive reasons on which public 
institutions depend for their authority operate through the exclusion 
of other relevant and rival reasons. That is how authorities are able 
to make up our minds for us, on all matters over which they have 
jurisdiction, other than the question of the wisdom of recourse to 
authority itself. In its other part it also follows from the self-
conscious detachment of such institutions from the organic, non-
deliberative, non-transparent fabric of our everyday lives. 
 
So there are two broad ways of managing the great complexities and 
deep contradictions of moral life, and with them two corresponding 
roles, ancient and modern, one comprehensively just in its ambitions, 
the other specifically so. Each approach exhibits certain distinctive 
vulnerabilities: the internal risks being insufficiently critical while the 
external risks being insufficiently nuanced. In the externalization that 
inspires justice and lays down the circumstances in which it is to be 
realized, reductiveness informs both the idea of justice and the extent 
of the role that reference to authority plays in our lives. How far do 
we make things matters of justice and of the institutions that 
authoritatively determine questions of justice? Do we go so far as to 
give primacy to justice and the institutions and practices that 
embody and secure it? 
 
In the case of children taking the first steps in the development of 
their moral life, the move to fairness is prompted by moral incapacity 
of a personal and internal kind, the moral incapacity that comes of an 
as yet imperfectly developed rationality. In collective adult life its 
promptings are incapacities of a different kind, stemming from the 
different forms of imperfect rationality and, more profoundly, from 
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the impossibility of perfection in the very nature of rationality. They 
include the size of a community and of its ambitions, the fluidity of 
social practices, the plurality of value and the diversity of legitimate 
goals that it gives rise to, and mistrust of the organic coupled with a 
correlative consciousness of the wrongdoing that the self-justifying, 
relativizing tendencies of organic practices licences or at least 
protects. What these promptings yield include formal institutions and 
practices of authority, demands for accountability to those 
institutions, and consequent demands for the transparency that 
accountability depends upon. From these resources we have built 
much of the modern world, with all the evils that it has ended, and 
all the goods that it has made possible. And of course and by the 
same token, we have demolished most of the virtues of the pre-
modern, and the modern evils that they forestalled. 
 
Questions of justice, and the political institutions that serve them, 
cut through the complications of moral life, in ways that the modern 
world has found refreshing and inspiring. It has enabled us to sweep 
away the organic, the opaque, and the unaccountable. And yet it has 
entailed huge costs, not only in health care, as suggested earlier, but 
also, and closer to home for most present readers, in academic life, 
just to pick an obvious local illustration. One can know how to be a 
good teacher, how best to explain, how best to assess, in a way that 
is fully internalized, so as to become part of one’s self-understanding 
in a manner that is not susceptible to articulation, and more tellingly, 
rightly so. One could stop there, defiantly inarticulate, and it would 
be good to do so. It is not simply that some things are better left 
unexplained. Rather it is that any attempt at explanation in settings 
such as this one would undermine what is good about what is being 
explained. In many universities today, however, one has to be able 
to account for the quality of one’s teaching in ways that re-shape the 
practice of teaching, at the expense of some of its best qualities. So 
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university teachers are now expected to attend to student assessments 
of their teaching in ways that clearly do not allow sufficiently, if at all, 
for the fact that the act of learning, at its best and at its deepest, is in 
many ways an unavoidably unpleasant experience, just as unpleasant 
as it is properly challenging. There is nothing at all good about pain 
(special cases of masochism aside perhaps), but many good things can 
only be acquired painfully, as Joseph Raz has pointed out. 
 
One can similarly know how to be an excellent researcher, in ways 
that are no less internalized, constituted as they are by deep grasp of 
a discipline, acute awareness of its distinctive demands, history, and 
prospects. Yet once again, in a growing number of countries today 
the practice of justice demands that the public funding of academic 
research be publicly accounted for, and so expects researchers to 
justify themselves to communities with no deep understanding of the 
discipline in issue, be they other academic communities, or 
communities that are dedicated to public goods other than those of 
academic life. In many cases it is not possible to meet those demands 
fully without engaging in a rather different kind of research, less 
specialized, less cloistered, sometimes less deep. One cannot be as 
open to the world as the demands of justice would have one be 
without meeting the terms of that world half way. Doing so is as apt 
to foreclose intellectual creativity as to give rise to it. More precisely, 
it leads intellectual creativity in certain directions and away from 
others. What is thereby gained in terms of ecumenicism and reach is 
lost in terms of specialism and enclosure. 
 
Here is the possibility: that we secure a culture in which certain 
failings, many of them quite serious, are eliminated, at the price of 
simultaneously and by the same means more or less removing from 
that culture the essence of what made it valuable. Even if one 
believes, optimistically, that new values are bound to occupy the 
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space left by the old ones, one is still left with good reason to regret 
the loss of those values that are no longer accessible. There will be 
more justice in the world, but correspondingly and consequently less 
of certain other good things. And if one doubts, as realistically one 
should, that new values can always be counted on to inform, no less 
successfully than the old values, what have become new ways of life, 
one then has even more reason to regret what justice has made 
impossible, even as one welcomes what it has achieved. 
 
Some of this is down to certain unfortunate, economistic ways of 
thinking, in which metrics are established so that scores can be given, 
alternatives can be ranked by number, and choices can be made in 
what are thought of as rational terms.2 Yet it is also entailed by the 
impulse to justice and the allocations that the practice of justice 
involves. The threat here comes not from the values of the private 
sector, but from those of the public sector. We ask public bodies to 
behave in these ways partly so that consumers can make choices, but 
partly too because we believe that public institutions ought to be 
accountable, and further, that accountability requires that the 
practices of public institutions be rendered in these terms. To fail to 
do so would be to hold oneself unaccountable. Back to the binary, 
in which what is not just is unjust. 
 
 
4.  Just Allocations  
 
I have so far spoken very largely in terms of symptoms rather than in 
terms of the pathology that gives rise to them. In part this has been 
because it is symptoms that we are most familiar with, and properly 
so, given that it is the basic function of both justice and its organic 
                                            
2 Thanks to John Gardner for posing this challenge. 
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alternatives to shape our engagement with the moral world in such a 
way that moral issues that we cannot resolve through the exercise of 
our own deliberation are displaced onto issues and modes of decision 
that yield resolutions for us, resolutions however that we can rely on 
because and to the extent that we are able to take them at face value, 
so leaving only symptoms to show for the success of their work. In 
short, these are the sorts of schemes that succeed only if one does not 
enquire into them too closely. As a consequence, analysis of them is 
liable to be both uncertain and puzzling. Yet here again, we typically 
know more than we let on, and one way to appreciate just how far 
that is the case is to inquire further into the fact of allocation and the 
distinctive role that it is called upon to play in the setting of justice. 
 
I suggested earlier, echoing John Gardner and others, that allocation 
is central to the idea of justice. I also suggested that there was rather 
more to it than that. Our lives are filled with forms of allocation that 
seem to have nothing to do with justice. A few quick examples will 
make the point clear. At any given moment of our lives we allocate 
our time, our energies, our selves, to one activity rather than another, 
(or even to absence of activity) and in doing so shape not simply that 
moment or that day, but the ongoing evolution of our commitments 
and our character. That is how we begin to become just who we are. 
Over time and usually with greater reflection we further allocate our 
lives to different goals and to different weightings of the same goals. 
In doing so we incrementally develop the narrative of a life. Some of 
the allocations that we make in this way are relatively conventional, 
as when we exercise a degree of prudence by saving for our age and 
its inevitable vulnerabilities. Others may be relatively original in our 
hands, as when we deliberately drop out of expected narratives just 
because we take issue in one way or another with what they call for 
from us. All these things are done on our own and, more commonly, 
through social practices. Not only at given moments but consistently 
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and over the course of a life we undertake allocations in conjunction 
with others, so as to engage, for example, in a division of labour, or 
of a shared responsibility, so allocating their burdens and benefits.  
 
In none of these allocations do we need to speak of justice. They are 
guided for the most part by reference to the good, as we perceive it 
and as it is given to us through social practices. To be aware of these 
ways of living, as we all are, is in itself to know that justice cannot be 
easily identified with the fact of allocation. Nevertheless there seems 
to be something especially allocative about justice, and the question 
that must now be faced is exactly what that is and how to tease it out. 
Allocation seems to come first in justice, so much so as to inform the 
very idea of fairness, where it comes second elsewhere. What might 
make that the case, if case it really be? It cannot simply be that the 
issue of justice arises in response to the presence of competing claims 
between persons, for many, perhaps most, of the claims described in 
the various quick examples offered above were claims regularly made 
between persons. Such claims are routinely settled without reference 
to the requirements of justice. Of course justice may well disapprove 
of that fact, in certain settings at least, but if so it is on the basis of a 
moral case for the application of justice instead, not on the ground of 
an alleged conceptual confusion on the part of those who invoke a 
different means of resolving conflict. 
 
When we engage with people without referring to justice we engage 
with them as bearers of values. Their significance to us as persons is a 
product of the value and disvalue that they bring to life, at any given 
moment and over the course of time, and more profoundly, of their 
status as living creatures (human beings as it happens) in possession of 
a particular, species-distinctive capacity for the realization of value 
and disvalue. In short, people matter just because and to the extent 
that they are able to make good (and bad) things happen in the 
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world. One might be tempted to think of this, with a nod to Joseph 
Raz, as the service conception of humanity. Whatever our human 
proclivities may be, and whatever sense of purpose may be discerned 
there, our existence derives its significance from its service or lack of 
service to the good. 
 
Not so as far as justice is concerned. In the eyes and hands of justice 
it is persons that matter, both first and foremost. Their significance is 
detachable, in practice and in principle, from the goodness that they 
are capable of giving rise to. Most obviously and immediately, justice 
is committed to certain familiar forms of moral blindness, and thus is 
constitutionally committed to a discounting of what full moral sight 
would recognize and record as morally relevant considerations. More 
profoundly, however, it calls upon the subjects of justice, insofar as 
they are subjects of justice, to be in principle detachable from the 
good, in all those dimensions of the good a degree of detachment 
from which may be necessary to the achievement of justice. There 
are no a priori exemptions from this broad demand. This leads justice 
to take persons seriously simply as persons, and to invest them with 
attributions of dignity and respect that do not derive from moral 
worth, or at least not from a moral worth that is in any way 
reducible by reference to the record of its exercise. It is in this 
commitment to persons that justice becomes recognizable, and in 
the breadth of the recourse to it that justice becomes modern. 
 
Justice famously takes the distinction between persons seriously, and 
has claimed much credit for that fact. Yet there are two different 
ways in which one might in principle take that distinction seriously, 
which justice conflates. The first is to insist on the individuation of 
value, so as to register it as value in the hands of some valuer, and 
thereby to honour and give effect to what I take to be the absolutely 
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vital relationship between value and valuers.3 Thus far justice is fully 
ad idem with most enlightened renderings of the good. The second 
way to take the distinction between persons seriously, however, is to 
give primacy to persons, and to accord them value by virtue of their 
personhood. It is in this respect that the good and the right part 
company. From the perspective of the good the value of personhood 
itself (that is, apart from its actual history in individual cases) is always 
a matter of potential: we are clearly owed something by virtue of 
our status as persons, but it is something basic to the species, that the 
species cannot alter, because it is something that is an inescapable 
feature of the human condition, invulnerable to the exercise of our 
everyday moral capacity. To think of it another way, it is a capacity 
that we cannot help but exercise, but it is still its exercise, and the 
value and disvalue which that gives rise to, that makes the capacity 
significant. On this view of the moral world the connection between 
our significance as persons and our service to the good is maintained.  
 
Not so for justice, from the perspective of which our significance as 
persons is independent of our service to the good. The crucial point 
seems to be this. Persons, as such, are what matter to justice, and 
they are bound to do so by the very concept of justice, because it is 
in their name and for their sake, not that of the good, that justice 
engages in the familiar determinations that it is its function to 
                                            
3 I follow Raz in thinking that value is for valuers in the sense that without there 
being valuers there could be no value: value is there to be appreciated. However 
value is not there to serve any valuers in particular (although some parts of it will 
clearly suit some valuers more than others) so that the perspective offered by 
justice, in putting persons first, is on the face of it a meta-ethical error that does 
moral good by offering us a way to achieve determinations that morality cannot 
generate from its own resources, but that the instantiation of morality in human 
lives makes necessary in many settings. Thanks to Christoph Kletzer for pressing 
me to expand this point further. 
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provide. Justice still and ultimately serves the good, of course, as any 
human endeavour is bound to, but it does so by serving persons first. 
Were it otherwise there would be no need for justice, distinctively 
understood, so that justice in the strict sense, once pushed, would 
quickly collapse back into justice in the broad sense. Justice in the 
strict sense is bound to put persons first, so as to make sense of itself. 
It can only do justice by taking the person more seriously than the 
goodness and badness that he or she gives rise to in the circumstances 
before it, by acting as if the function of value was to serve the person, 
rather than as if the function of the person was to serve value, as is of 
course actually the case, or there would be no value to justice, in its 
service to the person. 
 
It is important to be entirely clear here that to see justice as a matter 
of allocation between persons is not a way of returning to the idea 
that I set aside earlier, that justice is about competing claims between 
persons. That would be to put the idea of competition, rather than 
the idea of a person, at the centre of the picture of the allocations 
that we engage in when we have justice in mind. It is true that we 
very often think of allocation in that way, but that is simply because 
we very often think of allocation in terms of justice. Nevertheless it 
is clear that one can readily contemplate the idea of treating a person 
justly or unjustly even if he or she happened to be the last person on 
earth. It is no less clear that one can as readily contemplate doing 
oneself justice, or doing an injustice to oneself.4 Idiom is not in any 
way deceptive here. It might be initially tempting to think that this 
is the case if and only if one treats a person, whether that be oneself 
or another, with some other person, here a hypothetical person, in 
mind. On that view of the world, one is capable of treating oneself 
unjustly only because one is capable of being more than one person, 
                                            
4 Thanks to John Gardner for pressing this point upon me. 
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or less extravagantly, is capable of thinking of oneself in that way, as 
is evident from the very locution in which one is driven to describe 
the action involved, distinguishing as it does between the persons of 
one and oneself, the person acting and the person acted upon. Justice, 
one might think, does require that there be more than one person to 
allocate among, but there is always another person available, and 
indeed it is the gaze of justice that enables us to envision that person.  
 
Yet that is to miss the point. One can undoubtedly act in these terms, 
but it is not necessary to do so in order to do justice, to oneself or to 
another. One does justice or injustice by approaching a person with 
his or her status as a person uppermost in mind, whether or not any 
other person is on the scene, imaginatively or otherwise. Joseph Raz 
once spoke helpfully of the mark of incommensurability, as a way of 
testing for the presence of that fact, and perhaps the idea of such a 
mark might be as helpful here. The mark of justice, it seems to me, 
is respect for persons as such. It is not in any sense an accident, or a 
non-accidental but contingent fact, that justice treats the needy with 
respect while charity, for example, does not. Charity respects needs 
but not, other than derivatively, the people who have them. Justice 
respects persons, and as a consequence of that respect, respects their 
needs. It cares about needs because it cares about people, and people 
have needs. In short, it is as much the point of justice to respect the 
needy as persons as it is the point of charity not to do so. Thus the 
value of the mark: justice is revealed by the presence of the attitude 
of respect for persons.5  
                                            
5 Things are rather more ambivalent and overlapping than that of course. This cuts 
both ways. Respect for the good very often turns on the conclusions of justice, 
while in the hands of justice respect for persons is as variable as it is unvarying. 
Were it otherwise, respect for the good would be indifferent to questions of 
justice and injustice, so that goodness would be bound to respect the unjust no less 




Justice respects value, of course, for otherwise it would be arbitrary, 
yet it does so only as and when value is appropriately filtered by the 
scheme of justice in question, and thus in the dimensions which that 
particular scheme takes account of. In blocking off direct respect for 
value justice quite deliberately blocks off whole domains of good as 
well as of bad, matters that there is good reason to take account of as 
well as matters that there is good reason to ignore. In those domains 
in which respect for value is blocked off in this way the respect of 
justice for people is unvarying. If that seems in any way a surprising 
or implausible conclusion, its accuracy can be quite simply tested by 
contemplating the obverse. If the point pressed here were misguided 
then it would follow that the basic respect of justice is variable. Yet 
it is fundamental to the very idea of justice that its subjects are equal 
in its eyes. 
 
                                                                                                   
good, so that we would be bound to deliver justice without any reference to 
respect for persons in all their particularity and the bases on which that respect is 
grounded. Goodness and justice would simply have nothing to say to one another. 
In fact, of course, it is part of the very purpose of justice, and a central aspect of its 
proper functioning, to mete out treatment to people in accordance with their 
needs, deserts, or whatever the appropriate metric of justice is taken to be in any 
given setting. All those grounds are as much grounds of goodness and its absence 
as grounds of justice and injustice. Justice is quintessentially blindfolded, in this 
case to certain dimensions of goodness, but it does not follow that its conclusions 
are blind to the good, for the blindfold is only partial, ignoring some bases of 
respect for the good in order to focus on others. It is a premise of justice, and the 
ground of its blindness, that assessment of persons and the goods they embody 
proceeds from an unvarying respect for them as subjects of justice. Value and 
concomitant respect then flow through the filter of justice, so that in lieu of the 
variable respect that goodness would call for is respect for justice, and the 
unvarying initial regard it has for persons as persons rather than as embodiments of 
the good, on which its own partial respect for persons is built. 
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So to map the contrast, when we allocate with reference to the good, 
the allocation is made between claims of the good at the instance of 
persons. The difficulty with this is that it gives rise to problems of 
indeterminacy in the lives of persons just as often as the claims 
embodied in those lives are incommensurable, and allocation has, for 
whatever reason, good or bad, become necessary. As a result of the 
incommensurability, there may well be a number of legitimate 
answers to the question of how an allocation of goods (or bads) 
ought to take place in any given case, and in the absence of an 
authoritative determination of which of those legitimate answers is 
to prevail, there will be ample opportunity for conflict between 
persons on the behalf of legitimate claims. That is something of real 
concern to the good, of course, but it is not something that the good 
can do anything about, simply because the resources of the good are 
incapable of providing the resolution that persons, and the goodness 
that their existence embodies, are in need of. 
 
In the setting of justice, this pattern is very consciously upended: the 
allocation is one that is made between persons, precisely so that there 
can be a determination for persons. Justice exists to yield decision, 
and it does its characteristic work both by giving priority to the 
ingredients of decision, and by doing so through a focus on persons. 
This helps to explain the prominence of its most notable attendant 
features, allocation and conflict. The reason that allocation acquires a 
particular prominence in the scheme of justice is that the scheme is 
designed above all to secure allocation among persons. As far as those 
persons are concerned, allocation is just what the scheme is about. 
Goodness is attended to selectively, via procedures and institutions 
that first, possess the authority needed to yield decision, and second, 
are governed by established perspectives on the good that will make 
decision more likely, through the application of what Joseph Raz has 
classified as positive and negative second-order reasons. The further 
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reason that the presence of conflict appears to be a precondition of 
justice, is that in practice the inability to secure rationally determined 
allocations between persons often yields significant conflict between 
persons, although it is the good of rational determination for persons 
rather than the draining of conflict between persons that lies at the 
heart of the impulse to justice. 
 
Allocation and conflict are not the only leitmotifs of justice of course. 
The practice of justice also gives rise to a characteristic emphasis on 
the significance of the will, together with the attendant institutions 
of power, as well as the attendant virtue of courage, all of which gain 
much of their familiar prominence in the modern world as functions 
of the priority of persons in the scheme of justice. Persons instantiate 
goodness by the exercise of reason, here straitjacketed by the claims 
of justice, and of the will, here correspondingly enhanced. In the 
realm of the good, the will, and the courage that may be called for in 
its exercise, are necessary to the very possibility of goodness, indeed 
so much so as to become partly constitutive of it. That is because the 
will plays its moral role and acquires its moral import by virtue of its 
capacity to instantiate value as goodness (and disvalue as badness). In 
the realm of goodness the practices of reasoning and willing support 
one another in the realization of value in what we do and what we 
thereby become. On this rendering of the significance of will, the 
service conception of humanity is once again preserved.  
 
In the hands of justice, however, the fact of the will, and the value 
of its exercise, comes before the good, in two ways. Most obviously, 
the practice of justice is itself an act of willing insofar as it is a 
practice of decision, one that gives priority to the goodness of 
determination over the goodness in all that is thereby determined. 
More fundamentally, however, the practice of justice takes the fact 
of the will seriously in taking persons seriously, for from the point of 
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view of justice, persons are significant by virtue of the significance of 
those determinations that make them persons, determinations that 
they cannot always arrive at unaided, and that it is accordingly the 
role of justice to render on their behalf and in their stead. 
 
Doing these things gives rise to the price we pay for justice. Justice 
of course seeks to align as far as possible the claims of the good and 
the claims of decision (itself an aspect of the good) but the alignment 
is as imperfect as justice is necessary. The further that we extend our 
reference to justice, by extending the practice of justice to domains 
in which its presence and its role are permissible rather than vital, the 
more profound that price becomes. This much I have more or less 
emphasized throughout, yet there is further. I have spoken thus far as 
if justice was the only mode of determining moral conflict when that 
is clearly not the case. Determinations can be arrived at in a number 
of ways, by lottery even. What is not only distinctive but also 
distinctively modern about the determinations of justice is the focus 
upon persons. That means that the price that is paid in terms of the 
good by the determinations of justice is different in kind from the 
price paid in terms of the good by other forms of determination. As 
inhabitants of the modern world we are consciously sensitive to the 
price that is exacted by pre-modern, organic, non-deliberative forms 
of determination, yet correspondingly insensitive to the price we pay 
for justice. 
 
John Rawls has been much criticized for the alleged austerity of his 
conception of justice, on the part of critics who thought the austerity 
self-defeating and critics who regarded it as impoverished. Yet it will 
be clear that the austerity that Rawls sought to capture through the 
achievement of reflective equilibrium, and subsequently to depict in 
the spare lineaments of the original position, is at heart a function of 
the very concept of justice, rather than of any particular rendering of 
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it, a concept that was embraced as fully by the bulk of Rawls’s critics 
as it was by Rawls himself. Those critics, no less than Rawls, give to 
the person the priority that justice demands by its definition, though 
they would attribute to that person certain of the mores of particular 
communities. In doing so they render themselves doubly vulnerable, 
first to the price of justice, and second, to the price of community 
and the relativism to which it is vulnerable in prioritizing mores over 
morals. In effect they have sought to embrace two rival mechanisms 
for determination, each of which can only be ultimately successful 
by understanding itself in ways that are constitutively opposed to the 
other. 
 
Rawls has also been much credited, as noted above, for his insistence 
on taking the distinction between persons seriously. Yet utilitarians 
were surely right, despite their placement of humanity at something 
quite close to the centre of the moral world, in retaining a degree of 
recognition for the independence of value from persons, the degree 
that allows utility to reach the condition of other animals, and that 
prevents utility from taking persons fully seriously. Justice by contrast, 
proceeds as if value served humanity: it thus takes persons seriously 
qua persons, from which its particular sense of the distinction 
between them follows. That distinction, of course, famously makes it 
difficult to justify the sacrifice of one person for the sake of the well-
being of others. Yet that is not entirely a matter for congratulation. 
We can all readily agree that one person should not be tortured to 
make others happy, yet we surely both feel and ought to feel a good 
deal less comfortable with the fact that what blocks the warranting of 
such torture no less blocks, as a matter of principle, any compelled 
sacrifice of one person’s good to the good of others that cannot be 




5. Worlds without Justice 
 
There is much more to be said here, about the alternatives to justice, 
and about the social practices upon which those alternatives depend. 
Many of those practices are deeply rooted and local, in a way that 
modernity has set its face against, and that we have begun to miss, 
perhaps profoundly so. The backlash against globalization is typically 
rendered and explained as a backlash against neo-liberalism, and so 
against certain associated economistic ways of thinking, but it is also, 
and no less familiarly, a backlash against the scrutiny of justice, on 
grounds that are sometimes pernicious, as their commonly atavistic 
character plainly suggests, but that are sometimes morally perceptive. 
That is how, for example, the xenophobic is able to present itself as 
morally enlightened: there are indeed morally enlightened reasons 
for attending to what the xenophobic purports to attend to, though 
not for rejecting what it rejects. These are not things that a child of 
the modern world, such as myself, is terribly able to speak of, partly 
because of the familiar but negotiable problem of cultural distance, 
yet more importantly perhaps, because of the vast and rich variety of 
local possibilities for social practice, from among which it is difficult 
to abstract so as to speak in general terms without becoming guilty 
of what one might be tempted to call a degree of injustice, were one 
not so acutely aware that in fact and to the contrary the real danger 
is that of introducing a foreign degree of justice into the picture. For 
that reason I will not attempt to offer an account of those modes of 
determination that are latent in the practices of relationships and 
communities in the way that I have attempted to do for justice.  
Nevertheless it seems to me that there are a few, relatively safe 
preliminary observations that might be made in that respect. Beyond 
that it is probably wiser to stick to the suggestive. 
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First, it is wrong to contrast universal justice with the communal, or 
with ordinary virtue, as Michael Ignatieff put it in a recent Fulbright 
Lecture.6 That is to fall into the relativizing trap that justice rightly 
sets itself against, as well as into something like the tired opposition 
of the liberal and the communitarian. The true contrast is with the 
values that justice and the political are incapable of delivering, or at 
least, incapable of delivering well. Sometimes those can be identified 
with ordinary virtue, sometimes not. Conversely, ordinary virtue is 
sometimes capable of securing the ends of justice or something close 
to them, sometimes not. The interdependencies here are complex, 
though no less real for that fact. Indeed to simplify them, to look for 
informing structures, is already to adopt certain of the analytic 
premises of the perspective of justice. 
 
Second and relatedly, it is wrong too to say that justice is the first, or 
even the characteristic virtue of political institutions. Perfectionists 
are right to deny this. But it is not wrong to notice that politics is 
quite poor at kindness, generosity, love, and a range of other virtues, 
and that to the extent that we commit ourselves to politics and its 
particular virtues we diminish our collective access to rival virtues 
and to the worlds that they make possible. This diminution is simply 
what follows from the politicization of our collective moral life, 
something that continues to gather pace even today, ironically all the 
more so in many ways as it is challenged by an inarticulate backlash 
that it all too plausibly and in many cases quite accurately dismisses as 
reactionary.  
 
This is not to say that the very practice of politics is to be regretted, 
to espouse a romantic return to a supposed age of the pre-political, 
                                            
6 For the full expression of Ignatieff’s view see The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in 
a Divided World (2017). 
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to fall into the trap of thinking that to make choices in the manner 
that politicians do is inherently corrupt. In truth there is no way not 
to be political, not merely as a contingent practical matter, for 
example, in communities that are large, complex, and fluid, in the 
manner of much of the modern world at the moment, but because 
the demands that politics makes of us are demands that we are bound 
to make of ourselves, and rightly so, in whatever groupings we may 
be gathered, albeit that in making those demands of ourselves we are 
no less bound to recognize their proper limits, as well as their cost, 
which may run to the very existence and value of the social 
groupings upon which our life as social beings depends.  
 
Many people today aver that they are simply not political, as if that 
were a possible position for someone to hold. Yet not being political 
is itself a deeply political position. For all those who possess the 
capacity for politics (which is something close to all those who 
possess rational capacity) it is in fact the politics of apathy, or at least 
of abstinence, and very dangerous things follow from it, as well of 
course as very disappointing things, as those young people who have 
decided not to vote have often discovered to their cost, as they have 
found themselves in worlds that their grandparents voted for on the 
basis that they would be good worlds for grandchildren, rather than 
the worlds that they themselves would have voted for, as good for 
themselves. So justice is something that we are morally bound to 
pursue, as part of the moral necessity of politics, while also being 
something that we have good reason to temper. 
 
Third, therefore, it is wrong to condemn the pursuit of justice, as if 
the price attached to it somehow made it unworthy as an ideal. On 
the contrary, we have much to be deeply grateful to it for. What is 
not wrong, however, is to notice the correlative price attached to it 
in specific settings, and so to notice that it certainly is not all that you 
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need, any more than is love. They say (perhaps too often) that love 
hurts, but so too does justice. To speak in my own voice for a 
moment, spare me from the one who takes justice as his guide, and 
the niggardliness of his spirit, no less than the one who insists upon 
the loyalties of love, and the oppressions that go with them. 
 
Fourth, it is wrong to think that there can be worlds without justice, 
in the sense of there being worlds in which the writ of justice simply 
does not run. In a sense, to say this is no more than another way of 
putting the first of these observations. We are always and inescapably 
answerable to justice, and so accountable to its demands, in the same 
way that we are answerable to the presence of every other reason in 
the world. Culture and commitment have no power to insulate us 
from the claims of reason, no matter how alien, or how disruptive of 
the good, those claims might prove to be. Yet that having been said, 
the presence of commitment of any kind subtly changes the shape of 
the reasons that reason presses upon us, by changing the perspective 
from which they are bound to be contemplated on and responded to.  
 
I said earlier that we cannot but see the world in terms of a view 
from somewhere, and that being the case the settings in which we 
find ourselves have a vital role to play in framing our particular view 
of the world, and in shaping our relationship to it, in something the 
same way, perhaps, that one’s height does in framing one’s visual and 
physical perspective (think of Alice in Wonderland), although they 
have no capacity whatsoever to alter the terms of the world that is 
viewed, or the scrutiny that it receives. One can inhabit a domain, 
such as a personal relationship, that precludes scrutiny of certain 
kinds, and the consequence of one’s engagement in that domain is 
that it is thence that relationship, and in particular the specific 
preclusions it embodies, that forms the object of immediate scrutiny. 
It is perhaps something a little like the deflection that occurs in the 
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operation of the normal justification of authority. Reason wants to 
know in that as in any other case why we do not think for ourselves, 
and of course the answer cannot be given by thinking for ourselves 
without foregoing any benefit that observance of the exclusionary 
reason has to offer. Yet when, in proper recognition of that fact, the 
answer offered is the presence of the exclusionary reason, reason will 
thence want to know whether the alleged exclusionary reason is a 
sound one, and it will want to know that ultimately because it still 
wants to know why we do not think for ourselves, and the reference 
to the presence of the exclusionary reason has become the only way 
of answering that question. In short morality regularly requires us to 
be relativistic without thereby asking us to become moral relativists. 
 
Finally, one is bound to notice the connection between different 
values and the social institutions and social practices that they depend 
upon for their instantiation. One might reasonably ask whether the 
contemporary world is not overly monochromatic in these respects, 
notwithstanding its nominal commitment to diversity. One might 
wonder whether we are insufficiently attentive to the sources of the 
diversity that we nominally celebrate, not only of cultures, but more 
profoundly, of conceptions of the good and the conditions for their 
articulation. We cannot simultaneously be as morally diverse as we 
need to be to make liberalism fully meaningful in our hands, and as 
committed to justice as we need to be to make our liberal societies 
just societies. The best we that can hope for is that we will find a 
way to be diverse enough to make the palette of our possibilities a 
rich one, and also to be just enough to preclude significant iniquities 
in their assignment, that is, to be ancient as well as modern in our 
understandings of virtue, to couple the (potential) wisdom of age 
and the (potential) resolution of youth. Realistically however, what 
seems rather more probable, on the evidence of contemporary affairs, 
is that we are likely to do the opposite, resiling from justice for all 
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the wrong reasons, and embracing the communal uncritically. In that 
struggle it is plainly justice that we need to hold on to, while being 
clear-eyed enough to appreciate its limitations and its trade-offs, the 
role that those two defining features play in its rejection, and the 
need to envision a future that takes them both seriously.  
 
What then can be said about the social practices that constitute rivals 
to justice, and the ways in which they guide our pursuit of the good, 
for better and for worse? Many social practices arise unconsciously 
rather than consciously, as casual byproducts of shared circumstance, 
be that circumstance physical, cultural, intellectual or some other, be 
it played out in terms of landscape, tradition, economy or patterns of 
authority. The mutual recognition of their practitioners, if and when 
it arises (as it may well not), becomes the recognition of the fact of 
community, not so much in contrast to other communities, for those 
may be unknown, as in the assurance of itself. There gradually come 
to be certain ways of doing things that are understood and accepted 
as the right way to proceed in that setting, sometimes strongly so, as 
when actions and attitudes are regarded as more or less compulsory, 
sometimes temperately so, as when they are regarded as permissible. 
Precisely how this comes to be is not something that is or ever could 
be spoken of. Yet once it has been secured, the fact of understanding 
and acceptance acts as a kind of filter, which more or less excludes all 
other possibilities, be they rationally eligible or rationally ineligible. 
In this way a great many, though not all, dilemmas that stem from 
the lack of rational determinacy are quietly and effectively resolved 
without any recourse to deliberation, of the kind that justice engages 
in. The process at work here is something like the process whereby 
value comes to be embodied in character as personal virtue, although 
in the communal setting, as indeed in the personal setting, what is 
embodied is not necessarily virtuous. 
 
 29 
It is a common thought that such practices of propriety are designed 
to exclude. Sometimes the thought is a sound one, but more often it 
is not, partly because social practice does not usually look like that, 
and partly because it would work less well if it did. Social practices 
do not usually look like that because their creation and deployment 
is, as I have emphasized, usually not deliberate. They tend to emerge 
as byproducts of what we do for other reasons, and of a subsequent 
alignment of that experience in the minds of those who have shared 
it that gives rise to what is commonly described as intersubjectivity, 
if one can use that term happily without subscribing to its anti-realist 
implications. Furthermore, the good in such social practices, such as 
it is, is the good that comes from the ability to pursue value in ways 
that are relatively structured in advance and recognizable after the 
fact. Doing this can make the realization of value significantly more 
likely, if more predictable, and make the appreciation of value in the 
consequent narrative of one’s life that much more rich, complex and 
intertwined. None of these things depends on exclusion. To know a 
social practice in these ways is of course to be able to distinguish it 
from others, actual and hypothetical, but to identify that distinction 
with the very point of the practice (to the extent that there is one) is 
to mistake the possible corruption of the practice for its worth. 
 
The real moral concern with such practices, and with the absence of 
deliberation in their creation and implementation, is the familiar one 
of absence of reflection and self-examination. These social practices 
succeed just in the ways that they do not call for, or indeed permit, 
the level of examination that would reveal their moral arbitrariness. 
The moral price paid is the entrenchment of social practices as goods 
when what they are in fact is very often empty and even pernicious. 
Sometimes the emptiness may not much matter, for it may well 
become something that is merely rococo about the culture, eccentric 
but not at all damaging. Sometimes even the perniciousness may not 
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much matter, for it may be a price worth paying for a cultural whole 
that yields other goods, including the good of other aspects of 
determination, a whole from which the pernicious could not be 
successfully severed without adopting attitudes that were inimical to 
the very cultural acceptance on which the authority of the practices 
depends. As often, however, they are truly to be condemned. When 
that happens, one response is a turn to justice, although it is far from 
the only possible response. Vernacular social orders are as liable to be 
displaced by a turn to militarism, or anarchy. Those who recognize 
good reasons to overthrow them need always to be mindful that 
doing so does not necessarily yield justice, even when the overthrow 
is undertaken in the name of justice. This is no less true in miniature, 
when the social practice is relatively local in terms of its duration, 
extent, or subject matter, as it is comprehensively, when the social 
practice helps to constitute a dominant territorial order. 
 
I spoke earlier of the problem of false consciousness, and in doing so 
implicitly accepted the view that such consciousnesses are something 
to be regretted, and thus to be dispelled where possible and without 
too large a cost. Yet it is one of the principal functions of organic 
social practices, and a contributing element in their value, to develop 
false consciousnesses. Doing so enables practices to trade ruthlessly 
on the chimerical value of their purported inevitability and 
completeness, as well as on their genuine stability, for the very real 
value that acceptance of them as governing parameters in the 
articulation of lives individual and social can give rise to (the kind of 
value that is constituted, in part at least, by stability, community, 
recognition and the like), and furthermore, for the many kinds of 
goodness that may emerge from the standing embrace of such value. 
It is in these ways that we come not only to be tempted by but 
actually to discover and profit from the unreliable value of the 
practice of self-deceit, and the supporting value of myth. Self-
 31 
satisfaction is not always a bad thing, and self-examination not always 
a good one, it turns out, central though it is to the practice of justice, 
and rightly so, to regard them as such. 
 
Built into this approach to the world is a related idea, that of taking 
oneself much less seriously than the modern world expects one to. 
In speaking earlier of the possible shape of a loving relationship, I set 
aside the possibility of supererogation as being inconsistent with the 
self-understanding of the participants. One can now perhaps see why 
there was rather more to that move than respect for intuition, or the 
possibilities for argument that the move enabled. What such a loving 
relationship expresses is selflessness in a much deeper sense, a sense 
that transcends rather than sacrifices self. It is in that sense that love 
might well be thought of as the highest form of human relation, 
simply because it is the most uncompromised by the pull of interests 
other than those, if any, that identify with its own worth. The self-
abnegation that this involves on the part of the participants, at least as 
justice would perceive it, is something that is to be as far concerned 
about as persons matter qua persons. In the modern world, in which 
persons enjoy pride of place, and in which social practices are very 
largely shaped with persons in mind, it is something to be very 
concerned about indeed. That does not mean that such 
transcendence of oneself is not potentially valuable, and that there 
may not be good reason to pursue it in whatever setting, and to 
whatever degree, does not undermine the overall capacity of people 
to take themselves fully seriously as persons in other settings, and 
indeed to be so regarded by the other people on whom their dignity 
and their prospects depend. To transcend oneself in such a way is to 
achieve in one’s very being a blurring of boundaries with others, 
both as persons and as bearers of different values, and more 
profoundly, a blurring of boundaries between oneself and the world 
at large, and hence between oneself and the value that one’s life 
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gives rise to. This is selflessness without self-sacrifice, selflessness as a 
way of being. 
 
A second equally brief aside. To recognize this way of approaching 
the world and its potential legitimacy helps to expose the extent to 
which our ordinary thinking about social groups trades upon two 
different notions of a group, the one conceived in terms of justice, 
the other conceived in terms of relationship as I have outlined it. 
Many of the difficulties in thinking about groups, and indeed in 
thinking about social identity more generally, stem from the 
misattribution of the features of one, usually older conception of a 
group to a group that has in fact been identified by reference to the 
other conception. A conception that is conceived in terms of justice 
is often thereby called upon to do the kind of work that it is 
conceptually incapable of doing, and vice versa. 
 
A final brief aside. There is a common confusion in ordinary life and 
in political discourse as to what constitutes the direction of influence 
in the identification of the parameters of justice. For any particular 
conception of justice there is a question of which considerations that 
conception rightly excludes, so as to acquire distinctive legitimacy as 
the valid conception of justice that it is. It is those considerations that 
come to define what people are regarded as equal in terms of as far as 
that particular conception of justice is concerned. Given that the 
considerations in question also form the basis of the legitimacy of the 
conception of justice in question, it is entirely natural, yet mistaken, 
to search for some basis in the good to drive that exclusion. In fact, 
however, it is precisely because the good cannot supply that answer 
that justice becomes significant. The exclusion must of course be 
one that is permissible in terms of the good (for that is the source of 
its legitimacy), but it is one that by the premise of its very reason for 






In a way there should not be anything very surprising in anything I 
have said so far. Once it is recognized that justice is not simply the 
name for all that is good, but is rather the name for a particular value, 
commonly described as fairness, it follows straightforwardly from the 
fact of value pluralism that there are bound to be occasions when the 
claims of justice will be at odds with the claims of other values, and 
being different in kind from those other claims, will not be open to 
assessment as better or worse than their rivals. To believe otherwise 
is to believe, at a minimum, in the unity of the virtues, and despite 
its impeccable pedigree, that belief is not one that can be reconciled 
with a belief in the depth of value pluralism. Without the unity of 
the virtues, justice remains but one value among others, competing 
for our attention and a place in our lives. To know that much is ipso 
facto to know that justice has its inevitable price, as do its rivals. That 
price is far from straightforward, of course, because all values depend 
for many aspects of their realization on the existence of certain social 
practices, so that the pursuit of certain values depends on the 
presence of compatible social practices and discourages others, while 
the presence of certain social practices enables the pursuit of certain 
compatible values and discourages the pursuit of others. It is in this 
way that the priority of justice and certain social practices that are 
characteristic of the modern world (fluid, impersonal, detached and 
political) have come into being together, flourish together, and fail 
together. 
 
Left at that, however, the story seems not only residually counter-
intuitive, but quite possibly neglectful of other prominent available 
ways of prioritizing the claims of justice. After all, justice and other 
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values are regular presences in our lives, so that there must be at least 
some good ways of reconciling them, as modi vivendi if nothing more. 
I will consider two of what strike me as the most straightforward of 
those, before closing. 
 
One common and attractive thought is that there is companionship 
rather than rivalry to be found in the relationship between justice 
and its alternatives. We regularly pursue justice in certain domains 
and allow it to take a back seat in others. According to some, that is 
because justice is by its nature called for in certain domains (in the 
public realm perhaps) but not in others (such as the private realm). 
Or, to put it from the opposite perspective, certain domains call for 
justice while others simply do not. One would need to be extremely 
careful about the articulation of such domains, of course, and to be 
healthily skeptical of the existing boundaries of those that have been 
bequeathed to us, lest they incorporate injustices that are 
subsequently passed off by those that they privilege as practices to 
which justice inherently does not apply. A good deal of the recent 
history of feminist practice has been notoriously, and on the whole 
rightly, excoriating about attempts to secure a domain of the private 
against the scrutiny of justice. Indeed, a tacit recognition of that fact 
was implicit in the real doubts that I expressed above (in the second 
section) about the legitimacy of personal relationships that neglect 
justice or otherwise set it aside. Yet a warranted skepticism about the 
existing boundaries of the private is compatible with the possibility 
that some kind of companionship between justice and its alternatives 
is available in principle, however fraught the negotiation of it may 
be in practice.  
 
If there is to be such a relationship, and if it is to be one that is to be 
in any way relied upon, there must be principles in terms of which 
the relationship can be described, principles latent in the very idea of 
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justice, and no less so in the ideas encapsulated in its rivals. Those 
principles would have to be capable of assigning all values to related 
domains of human activity, not always uncontroversially perhaps, for 
the project could be subject to marginal exceptions, but for the most 
part exclusively. Yet in fact there is no conceptual algorithm of that 
kind that could eliminate the rivalry. Indeed the thought that there is 
or could be such an algorithm is only really plausible to the extent 
that one is prepared to believe that all values, here including justice 
of course, are nothing other than abstract projections of the character 
of human activity, and hence of the domains into which that activity 
is demarcated, from place to place and time to time. Fit with domain 
would then be a premise of value. Yet the disturbing implication of 
value pluralism, where pluralism is understood in realist terms, is that 
conflict between the claims of value is an endemic feature of moral 
life, one that cannot be escaped by reference either to the content of 
morality or to the particular domains in which particular dimensions 
of morality are called upon. It can of course be moderated by ideas 
of appropriateness, but it cannot be displaced. That makes life less 
easy than it might be, yet much richer and more rewarding, as well 
of course as more overwhelming and more distressing. 
 
So sometimes it is possible to say that this is a place and a moment to 
be kind rather than just, or vice versa, but that possibility is one that 
stems from the presence of social practices that have established that 
sense of appropriateness, and further, that have constituted it as the 
common sense of the culture in question, according it the status of a 
moral fact without making it one. As much is as true of the social 
practices, characteristic of the modern world, in which the priority 
of justice is embedded. We can turn to those practices to discover 
the proper place of justice as we know and live it, but we cannot 
look to justice, or to any other value, to scrutinize or supplant those 
practices by telling us where justice belongs and where it doesn’t. It 
 36 
is this, rather than some logic of harmony and reconciliation, that is 
inherent to the idea of justice, so as to make it the idea that it is 
rather than some other. From the point of view of justice, it is not 
that justice is in principle a value that is bound to run everywhere, so 
that we should only ever act in accordance with justice. Rather it is 
the more modest claim, that any scheme of assignment, according to 
which justice is appropriate in some settings and not others, is itself 
susceptible to the scrutiny of justice, if not to warrant its overthrow 
then at least to open our eyes to its very real cost. That means that 
justice cannot be kept in what is supposed to be its place. Its reach is 
as broad and demanding as is the reach of reason. We are always and 
everywhere accountable to justice, although when we render to 
justice what is its due we may well give up something no less 
valuable. 
 
Another, perhaps even more appealing thought is that justice sets a 
threshold for legitimate social order, past which other values describe 
courses of human interaction that are consistent with justice without 
being animated by it. Such patterns of accommodation are not only 
possible but familiar features of our lives. Yet that is because we very 
often make a practice of reconciling the irreconcilable, sometimes ad 
hoc and individually, sometimes by creating and maintaining social 
practices that constitute working compromises (between the rational 
and the irrational, or between different kinds of rational claim), some 
of those compromises morally permissible, some not, some of them 
morally intelligible in terms of the good that they give rise to, so as 
to be at least excusable, some not. The fact that we very often get by 
in these ways might show that we have a reason to get by (as indeed 
we well may), or that we believe that we do, but it does not show 
that there is nothing to get by, that justice finishes its work where 
other values begin theirs, so that conflict between them is not a 
genuine problem in the conduct of our lives. 
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There is nothing I can discern in the idea of justice to suggest that its 
remit is an austere one, that it has nothing to say to the details of the 
allocations between persons, that its role is exhausted by laying the 
foundations for the operations of other values. Surely to live justly, 
as it is admirable to do, is to be animated by justice and answerable 
to its demands in all that one does. The same, of course, can be said 
of the values and virtues with which justice is potentially in tension. 
It is not their place to take as their premise the foundations that 
justice would lay down. Like the claims of justice, their claims reach 
in both directions, from the foundational to surface detail, so as to 
make their voice heard and their presence felt in all parts of our lives. 
One way to see this, it seems to me, is to remind oneself that value 
does not exist for humans, making it difficult to think that it could 
be aligned with anything like a threshold in our lives.  
 
In the end these are different gods with different appetites. Whether 
we have chosen to worship at the altar of one rather than the other, 
or whether we are in a dilemma of belief, or whether we are bound 
to improvise a course among their claims as a sailing vessel navigates 
a course among the claims of wind, water and provisional destination, 
we must recognize that we cannot honour both in the same breath. 
 
 
